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IDENTICAL COUSINS?: ON THE ROAD WITH
DILUTION AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Mary LaFrancet & Gail H. Clinett
Abstract
The dilution doctrine and the right of publicity have a great deal
in common, because both represent property-like rights that have
evolved from legal doctrines largely unrelated to property concerns.
Although both doctrines have engendered controversy in the United
States, the dilution doctrine generally evokes greater skepticism and
confusion. This Article evaluates how these concepts are viewed in a
number of jurisdictions outside the United States. From this
examination, two conclusions emerge. First, despite the similarities
between the doctrines, countries do not tend to adopt or reject them in
tandem. Second, the degree to which each doctrine achieves
widespread and well-understood acceptance in a particular country
depends on whether and to what extent that doctrine has evolved from
the nation's own legal and cultural traditions. When a country adopts
either of these doctrines largely as a result of international pressures
or legislative mandates that have little foundation in domestic
traditions, judicial confusion and/or resistance are common results.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the dilution doctrine and the right of
publicity have a great deal in common - not in their origins, but in
their current application. Yet the dilution doctrine currently engenders
more skepticism and confusion than publicity rights. This Article
inquires how these parallel concepts are faring outside the United
States. From examining the status of these doctrines in Japan,
continental Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, two
conclusions emerge. First, the similarities between the doctrines do
not lead countries to adopt or reject them in tandem. Second, the
stable and successful establishment of each doctrine in any given
country depends on whether that doctrine has emerged as a natural
evolution from the nation's legal and cultural traditions. Incoherent
and inconsistent judicial interpretations tend to result when either
doctrine is introduced by other mechanisms, such as global
harmonization pressures or a legislative process that fails to include
sufficient efforts to assess the benefits and burdens of the proposed
legislation.
II. IDENTICAL COUSINS AT HOME
In the United States and a number of other countries, trademark
dilution laws have evolved as a relatively recent departure from
traditional unfair competition and trademark doctrines that are based
on a likelihood of consumer deception or confusion.' Over a
somewhat longer period of time, right of publicity laws have evolved
from traditional privacy concepts.2 Each doctrine has, to some extent,
left its historical roots behind. The theory of dilution, where
recognized, is now completely divorced from concerns about
consumer confusion or deception (i.e., about the origin or
endorsement of goods or services).3 The right of publicity is now, in
an increasing number of countries, recognized as a property interest
that is separate from the traditional concept of privacy as a right of
personality designed to protect personal feelings and dignity.
4
1. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 24:67 (4th ed., 2007).
2. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from
Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1167-71 (2007); Huw BEVERLY-SMITH, ANSGAR OHLY
& AGNES LUCAS-SCHLOETTER, PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY 64-68 (2005).
3. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 24:69.
4. As used in this article, "dilution" refers to protection of marks against unauthorized
uses without regard to whether the unauthorized use is likely to cause consumers to be confused
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In countries where these transitions have been most complete,
this parallel evolution has led to the recognition of two new intangible
property rights. Under dilution law, trademarks are treated as a form
of property rather than simply as a signaling device that enables
consumers to distinguish one vendor from another. 5 Where the right
of publicity is fully developed, the commercial use of a person's
identity is now treated more as a conversion of property than as an
injury to the person. 6 Although their origins are quite different, the
dilution and publicity doctrines have seemingly converged, leading
some to suggest that dilution law is "a right of publicity for
corporations."7
Thus, while dilution and the right of publicity have disparate
origins, the rights have substantively converged. In either case, the
infringer is accused of using the plaintiff's valuable property right to
enhance the consumer appeal of the defendant's goods or services by
capturing the emotional responses that are aroused by the plaintiff's
intangible property, but without confusing the consumer about the
origin or sponsorship of the defendant's goods or services. The
claimant of the property right, on the other hand, asserts ownership of
the favorable associations connected to the claimant's identity -
whether that identity is brand identity or the identity of an individual
person.
The parallels between dilution and the right of publicity are also
seen in the criticisms to which they are subject. Most notably, both
concepts are in tension with free expression. 8 Both doctrines have also
been criticized for placing excessive burdens on competition. 9 In
with regard to either (1) the origin of the defendant's goods or services or (2) the relationship
between those goods and services and the senior user. "Right of publicity" refers to the
protection of a person's name or likeness against unauthorized commercial uses, regardless of
whether that right is property-based or personality-based.
5. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 24:70.
6. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:7 (2d ed.,
2007).
7. Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1061 (2006). Alternatively, one
could characterize the right of publicity as dilution law for people. Cf Dogan & Lemley, supra
note 2, at 1198-1200 (suggesting that the standards of dilution law could be applied to limit the
scope the right of publicity).
8. See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987)
(holding that applying Maine's dilution statute to parody of plaintiff's clothing catalog violated
First Amendment); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that
television news broadcast of plaintiff's "human cannonball" performance violated his right of
publicity).
9. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 841-45 (6th
Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that too liberal an application of the right of
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addition, courts and lawmakers continuously wrestle with defining the
scope and nature of the rights encompassed by dilution and right of
publicity claims. For example, in the case of dilution, there is
continuing uncertainty as to: which marks should be protected, 10 the
degree of similarity necessary to support a dilution claim, 1 the nature
of the injury arising from dilution, 12 and how that injury may be
proved. 13 With respect to the right of publicity, perennial issues
include: which aspects of identity are protected,' 4 whether the right is
transferable and/or descendible, 15 and the degree of similarity
necessary to establish that a specific person's identity has been
evoked. 
16
While the right of publicity seems to be steadily expanding in
most states, a recent article by Professor Clarisa Long documents a
decline in the success of dilution claims brought in the United States
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) since 1998, and
suggests that this trend may reflect a judicial resistance to the concept
publicity inhibits free enterprise); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away
of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PiTT. L. REV. 789, 795 (1997) (arguing
that dilution laws "pose an anticompetitive threat to market efficiency and consumer welfare").
10. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act,
11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 187, 196-98 (2007) (criticizing the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006 for extending federal dilution protection to descriptive marks and broadening its
application to trade dress in contravention of case law taking a more restrictive approach);
Caroline Chicoine & Jennifer Visintine, The Role of State Trademark Dilution Statutes in Light
of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 1155, 1166-71 (2006)
(noting different standards for fame and distinctiveness under federal and state dilution laws).
11. See, e.g., Chicoine & Visintine, supra note 10, at 1172-73 (noting difficulty of
articulating a uniform rule regarding degree of similarity required).
12. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008) (analyzing claims that dilution increases consumer search
costs).
13. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d
495, 504-05 (E.D. Va. 2006), affd on other grounds, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007)
(acknowledging that the case was governed by the 2006 TDRA, which suggests specific factors
for assessing "likelihood of dilution," but instead applying case law addressing likelihood of
dilution under the New York state statute).
14. See, e.g., Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (declining to extend right of publicity to soundalikes, despite California case law to the
contrary).
15. California has just retroactively extended its postmortem rights of publicity to
celebrities who died before 1985, responding to pressure after courts in New York and
California held that Marilyn Monroe's heirs had no enforcible right. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344.1
(West Supp. 2008).
16. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that game show celebrity's right of
publicity should not extend to a humorous ad depicting a robot wearing a similar wig and
evening gown and appearing on a set resembling the game show set).
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of dilution.' 7 In her view, possible causes for the courts' disquietude
include the elusive nature of the harm, the possible social benefits of
dilution, reluctance to apply dilution to nontraditional origin
indicators such as product design, uncertainty as to which marks are
famous and distinctive enough to warrant this extra degree of
protection, and concern over a possible conflict between dilution law
and exhaustion of rights.' 8 She describes this judicial attempt to limit
the impact of dilution law as a "bottom-up phenomenon."' 9 Even
before the FTDA, state dilution laws experienced a mixed reception
from judges who were reluctant to abandon confusion-based
infringement doctrine and uncertain how to limit the scope of
trademark protection once the likelihood of confusion was no longer
available as a limiting factor.20 If the judiciary's uneven handling of
state dilution laws and the FTDA was a "bottom-up" reaction, then
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA) was a "top-
down" response.2' It remains to be seen, however, whether the
judiciary will display a greater comfort level with the TDRA than
with its state and federal predecessors.
III. LESS-THAN-IDENTICAL ABROAD
In recent years, both the dilution and right of publicity doctrines
have received increasing recognition outside the United States.
However, no multinational agreements require countries to
incorporate the dilution doctrine into their national trademark laws.
22
17. Long, supra note 7, at 1032.
18. Id. at 1062-75.
19. Id. at 1075.
20. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir.
1989) (rejecting a dilution claim using an analysis more suitable to determining a likelihood of
confusion).
21. Among other changes, the TDRA made the federal dilution statute expressly
applicable to both blurring and tarnishment claims, introduced a set of factors for courts to
consider in assessing a likelihood of dilution by blurring, clarified that dilution protection is not
limited to inherently distinctive marks, and overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Moseley
v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), by specifying that a plaintiff is required to
prove only a likelihood that the defendant's conduct will dilute its mark, not that dilution has
already occurred. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007).
22. Recently,, the United States has included mandatory dilution protection in several of
its bilateral Free Trade Agreements. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. In the European
Union, Article 4(3) of the 1988 Trade Mark Harmonization Directive mandates dilution
protection for Community Trademarks, but there is no comparable requirement for national
trademarks. First Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1. See infra note 87 and
accompanying text. While Article 16(3) of the WTO Agreement's TRIPS provisions applies to
the use of a similar mark on dissimilar goods or services, members are required to prohibit such
use only where the use "would indicate a connection between those goods or services and the
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Likewise, the right of publicity is not addressed in any international
23agreements. As a result, the lack of consensus in the United States
with respect to these doctrines is not only mirrored, but surpassed, by
the lack of uniformity abroad.
Due to the conceptual parallels between the two doctrines and
their nearly parallel evolution in the United States, it seems
appropriate to inquire whether a similar pattern of development is
emerging overseas. One might expect that countries recognizing a
strong right of publicity would be favorably inclined toward
recognition of the dilution doctrine, and that, conversely, countries
skeptical of one doctrine might view the other with similar caution.
As discussed in Part IV, however, preliminary research suggests
that no such simple pattern can be detected, and that the two doctrines
do not emerge in tandem. The reason appears to be that their legal and
cultural foundations are too different. Traditional trademark and
unfair competition laws that are based on preventing consumer
deception are nearly universal, and are well understood at a visceral
level without regard to cultural differences. Dispensing with the
requirement of a likelihood of confusion in the case of famous marks
- as the United States has done - is a significant departure from that
tradition, and countries differ in their willingness to embrace this
change and in their perception of the benefits of this policy weighed
against the burdens on competition and free expression.
Although widely recognized, the right of privacy - the
foundation of the right of publicity - is not universal. Countries with
strong traditions of protecting privacy rights generally extend those
rights to a person's name and likeness.24 In many cases, these
countries are gradually transitioning from a personality-based right to
one that has aspects of a property right.25 Countries which lack a
strong tradition of general privacy rights have no basis for
recognizing the right to a person's name and likeness either as a right
of personality or as a property right. In these countries, unauthorized
owner of the registered trademark mark." Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Annex IC, art. 16(3), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
23. The right of privacy, in general terms, is mandated for countries adhering to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr. 11,
1950, art. 8(1), Council of Europe T.S. No. 5, available at
http://conventions.coe.intreaty/en/Treaties/htmO05.htm.
24. See notes 76-84, 100-108, 171-189, and accompanying text.
25. See notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
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commercialization of a person's identity is actionable only where
other legal doctrines can be invoked (such as passing off or
defamation).26
Another observation that emerges from this legal road-trip with
dilution and the right of publicity is that their acceptance depends a
great deal on the process by which those rights came to be
established. Where the rights have emerged gradually and are based
on domestic policies rooted in shared cultural understandings, the
rights are strongly protected. Where the rights have been imposed
suddenly and without significant domestic policy debate (for
example, where the doctrines have been adopted in response to
international pressures), the rights are viewed with skepticism and
receive a less-than-coherent reception from the judiciary.
Globally, dilution protection is not mandated by any
multinational agreements, except for Article 4(3) of the European
Union's 1988 Trade Mark Harmonization Directive. Article 4(3)
requires European Union members to provide dilution protection to
registered Community Trademarks, although it does not require
similar protection for national trademarks.2 7 Prior to 1988, dilution
laws were already well-established in the Benelux countries and in
Germany, where they are said to have originated.28 All of the pre-
2004 members of the European Union have amended their trademark
laws to incorporate dilution protection for their nationally registered
trademarks pursuant to voluntary provisions contained in the
Directive.29
Although Article 16(3) of the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement requires members to protect "well-
known" trademarks, 30 it does not mandate dilution protection. In
1999, the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial
Property and the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) recommended adoption of dilution laws to
protect well-known marks in their Joint Recommendation Concerning
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks. 31 Unlike Article
26. See notes 135-156, 207-213 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
29. J. Thomas McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European and United States Law
Compared, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1163, 1163 (2004).
30. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22.
31. Article 4(1) of the Joint Recommendation recommend protecting well-known marks
against the use of any similar mark that "is likely to impair or dilute in an unfair manner" or that
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16(3) of TRIPS, this recommendation has no binding effect. Despite
the absence of any international mandates, dilution laws have been
adopted by a number of countries outside of the European Union,
including Mexico,32 Peru,33 South Africa,34 Canada35 and Japan.36 Of
these countries, only Canada had a dilution law on its books prior to
1993. 37 Several recent free trade agreements negotiated by the United
States include mandatory dilution provisions.38
Like dilution laws, protection for the right of publicity is not
mandated by any multinational agreements. Unlike dilution, however,
the right of publicity has not been addressed in any of the free trade
agreements negotiated by the United States, most likely because the
impact of such infringements on the United States economy has not
been quantified. Even the broader concept of privacy protection is not
addressed in international agreements, except for the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR). The ECHR addresses privacy only in general
terms which do not seem to mandate protection for a person's right to
prevent the unauthorized use of his or her likeness. 39 Despite the
absence of international mandates, however, many countries provide
strong and well-established protection for names and likenesses, often
without any explicit legislation on the subject.40
"would take unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the well-known mark." WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., JOINT RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING PROVISIONS ON THE
PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN MARKS art. 4(l)(b)(ii)-(iii) (1999), http://www.wipo.int/about-
ip/en/development iplaw/pdf/pub833.pdf.
32. Ley de la Propriedad Industrial, Art. 90 (XV) (2005). See John M. Murphy, The
Confusing Similarity Standard in Mexican Trademark Law, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 1182, 1209
(2006).
33. Legislative Decree 823; Decision 486. See also INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N, THE
PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN MARKS IN ASIA-PACIFIC, LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA 19-20
(Oct. 2004), available at http://www.inta.org/membersonly/downloads/ref.Asian.pdf
[hereinafter PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN MARKS].
34. PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN MARKS, supra note 33, at 21-23; South Africa
Trademarks Act, Arts. 10(17), 34(1)(c).
35. See infra notes 158-170 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 41-75 and accompanying text.
37. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
39. "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his
correspondence." European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 23 at art. 8(1).
40. See infra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
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IV. COUSINS ON THE ROAD
International comparisons with respect to dilution and the right
of publicity are difficult due to the wide range of interpretations and
the absence, in many cases, of significant case law. Only a few
countries have clearly established their positions with respect to both
doctrines. Australia and the United States, for example, are at
opposite positions on the spectrum with respect to both doctrines,
with Australia resisting both. Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom
are struggling to understand their own dilution laws, while only one
of the three - the United Kingdom - has yet to embrace publicity
laws.
A. Japan
As discussed below, legislative adoption of dilution laws in
Japan has led to confused and less-than-coherent responses from the
judiciary. In contrast, protection for the right of publicity is well-
established, having arisen not through top-down legislation but as an
outgrowth of general tort law. Moreover, the right of publicity is
recognized as both a moral right and an economic right.
1. Dilution
Unlike many other civil law countries (notably the EU
countries), Japan has adopted dilution-type legislation that protects
both registered and unregistered marks. Article 4-1(19) of the
registration provisions in Japan's Trademark Act bars registration of a
mark that is similar to another person's well-known mark if it is used
for "the purpose of gaining unfair profits, the purpose of causing
damage to the other person, or any other unfair purposes." 41
This language was added to Article 4-1 in 199642 in response to
"the increased demand for clarification of the protection of well-
known and famous trademarks, 43 in an attempt to "prevent the use of
trademarks that are widely known in Japan or other countries with
unfair intent."44 The statutory language implies that the prohibition
applies only when the applicant has unfair intent. The intent
41. SHOHYO-HO [TRADEMARK ACT], Law No. 127 of 1959, art. 4-1(xix) (amended
2005), translation available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/TA.pdf (unofficial
translation provided by Japan's Cabinet Secratariat).
42. JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, TRADEMARK EXAMINATION MANUAL § 42.25(1) (2001),
available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/quicke/index_sh.htm.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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requirement is consistent with pre-1996 case law in which Japanese
courts resorted to concepts such as plagiarism and trademark abuse to
deny the benefits of registration to parties that deliberately imitated
famous marks.45
The Trademark Examination Manual of the Japan Patent Office
(JPO) leaves little doubt that this bar to registration reflects dilution
principles:
Well-known and famous trademarks, which have become widely
known and have gained a high reputation, credit and popularity
among consumers as a result of the company's long, hard efforts
and a considerable amount of advertising costs, can be considered
to possess sufficient capability to attract consumers and to have
worthy property values themselves.
The use of such well-known and famous trademarks by a third
party may not necessarily cause confusion over the source of goods
etc., but it may weaken the source-indicating function or harm the
reputation of these well-known and famous trademarks. Therefore,
it is necessary to sufficiently protect these trademarks from illicit
use, bearing in mind such purposes.
46
The Trademark Examination Manual thus interprets Article 4-
1(19) as incorporating both blurring and tarnishment concepts. Article
4-1(19) is designed to preclude registration of a trademark identical or
similar to one that is "famous nationwide" because, even though the
second registration "may not necessarily cause confusion of the
source of goods, etc.," it "may weaken the source-indicating function
or harm the reputation of the said famous trademark.'A 7 The Manual
also confirms that the bar to registration applies only where the
applicant has "unfair intent," and not where the similarity of the
marks arises "by chance. '48 However, where the marks are very
similar and the well-known mark is unusual (e.g., a coined word) the
JPO trademark examiner is permitted to presume the existence of
unfair intent.49
Similarly, the JPO's Trademark Examination Guidelines provide
that Article 4-1(19) bar registration of:
45. See Masaya Suzuki, The Trademark Registration System in Japan: A Firsthand
Review and Exposition, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 133, 169-70 (2001).
46. JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, TRADEMARK EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 42.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 42.25(2).
49. JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR TRADEMARKS ch. 111, pt. 17,
§ 5 (2007), available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/quick-e/indexsh.htm.
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A trademark identical with or similar to a trademark well known
throughout Japan, for which an application has been filed with an
intention to dilute the distinctiveness of the well-known trademark
to indicate the source of goods or impair the reputation, etc. of the
trademark owner, however the trademark of that application er se
is not liable to cause confusion over the source of the goods. 0
Accordingly, registration of a trademark is barred only if the dilution
or impairment of reputation is intentional.
The Guidelines also note that, in determining whether a mark is
used for "unfair purposes," the examiner should consider "[m]aterials
showing that a trademark, if used by its applicant, is liable to impair
credit, reputation, consumers-attractiveness built up in a well-known
trademark., 51 This language suggests that the examiner should be
concerned only with trademark uses that have a tarnishing effect,
rather than uses which merely undermine the distinctiveness of the
well-known mark or which "free-ride" on the notoriety and favorable
associations of the mark. In contrast, the Manual suggests that both
blurring and tarnishment are grounds for refusing registration.52
Despite their differences, both the Manual and the Guidelines clearly
interpret Article 4-1(19) as precluding registration only where the
applicant has some kind of predatory intent. Finally, while neither the
Manual nor the Guidelines suggest that registration should be denied
based on free riding alone without proof of a tarnishing or a blurring
effect, the statutory reference to "gaining unfair profits ' 53 appears to
support this additional ground for denial.
Article 2-1 of Japan's 1993 Unfair Competition Prevention Act
provides a cause of action for the trademark owner against:
(1) acts of creating confusion with another person's goods or
business by using an indication of goods or business (which means
a name, trade name, trademark, mark, or container or package of
goods used in relation to a person's business, or any other
indication of a person's goods or business; the same shall apply
hereinafter) that is identical or similar to said person's indication of
50. Id. § l(b) (emphasis added). Although "well known" is not defined in this context, the
section of the Guidelines that addresses defensive registrations indicates that "well known"
means "famous." See id. ch. XIII, § 1. With respect to Art. 4-1(19) of the registration statutes,
the JPO's Trademark Examination Manual equates "trademarks widely recognized by
consumers" with "famous" trademarks. See TRADEMARK EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note
42, § 42.14.
51. EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR TRADEMARKS, supra note 49, § 4(f).
52. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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goods or business that is well known among consumers or other
purchasers ... ,
(2) acts of using as one's own an indication of goods or business
that is identical or similar to another person's famous indication of
goods or business....54
When these two subsections of Article 2-1 are compared, it
seems clear that subsection (2) is the only one that could be
characterized as a dilution provision, because it makes no reference to
a likelihood of confusion. It also differs from subsection (1) in that it
refers to "famous," as opposed to merely "well known" marks,
although it is not altogether clear how Japanese courts are to
distinguish between these categories.55
In Professor Port's recent study of Japanese dilution law, he
notes that the legislative history of the 1993 unfair competition
amendments specifically indicates that they were intended to prevent
"free riding." 56 This same passage in the legislative history however,
goes on to suggest that, as a result of free riding, "consumers might
become confused that this newcomer is the same as the company that
endeavored to obtain high trust and repute." 57 It is not clear whether
this means that consumers will believe that the goods or services are
from the same company, or merely that they are the same in their
characteristics and quality. Additionally, in spite of referencing
confusion, the report elsewhere states that a dilution claim should not
depend on consumer confusion.58
The creation of a dilution cause of action in Japan was not a pure
"top down" phenomenon. Prior the 1993 amendments, Japanese
54. FUSEI KYOsO BOSHI-HO [UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT], Law No. 47 of
1993, art. 2-1, translation available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/ucpa.pdf
(unofficial translation provided by Japan's Cabinet Secratariat). For an alternate translation, see
Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Dilution in Japan, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 228, 229
(2006).
55. As noted earlier, supra note 50, the Trademark Examination Guidelines appear to
treat well-known marks as synonymous with famous marks, although this interpretation of the
trademark registration statutes by the Japan Patent Office would not necessarily carry over to the
Unfair Competition statutes, nor would it appear to be binding on Japanese courts. In Advance
Magazine Publishers, Inc. v. Puropasuto, 1890 HANREI JIHO 127 (Tokyo D. Ct., July 2, 2004), a
case discussed by Professor Port, the Tokyo District Court treated the name of a magazine as
well known but not famous where it was well known to readers of fashion magazines but not to
the general public. See Port, supra note 54, at 246.
56. Port, supra note 54, at 233 (citing SANGYO Kozo SHINGIKAI CHITEKI ZAISAN
SEISAKU BUKAI HOKOKUSHO [REPORT OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY COMMITTEE
OF THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE COUNCIL] (1992)) [hereinafter IPPC REPORT].
57. Id.
58. See id.
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courts often, in the case of identical marks, presumed confusion even
where confusion was unlikely, in an effort to protect marks from free
riding. 59 This practice suggests that, even before the dilution
provisions were enacted, such free-riding was inconsistent with the
Japanese judiciary's fundamental sense of commercial morality.
Nonetheless, as discussed below, the judiciary's interpretation of the
1993 amendments suggests that the courts are confused about the
difference between dilution and traditional confusion-based doctrines.
Despite the Japanese courts' past willingness to find confusion
even where it is unlikely, Professor Port has noted that very few
dilution-type claims have been brought under the unfair competition
statute.6 ° Of the cases he reports, one involving product design trade
dress is analyzed under Article 2-1(1) - the confusion provision -
rather than Article 2-1(2).6 1 The Tokyo High Court rejected the
dilution claim, reasoning that if there had been dilution then the
plaintiffs product design would have ceased to be famous and would
have lost its ability to function as an origin indicator.62 By requiring
proof of actual blurring, this reasoning overlooked the "free rider"
aspect of dilution which, it appears, Article 2-1(2) was intended to
encompass. This supports one of the hypotheses posed by Professor
Long in her study of FTDA cases - that judges are reluctant to extend
dilution protection to unconventional marks such as product design.
63
A second case under Japan's unfair competition statute involved
an entertainer who adopted a stage name very similar to a company's
well-known mark.64 The Tokyo District Court analyzed the claim
under Article 2-1(1), finding that the defendant's name caused
confusion. 65 This time, Professor Port notes, the court condemned the
defendant's action as free-riding, thus using a dilution concept to
justify a finding of confusion. 66
Professor Port also reports a Tokyo District Court decision
holding that the name VOGUE for a fashion magazine was well-
known but not famous, and therefore was not eligible for dilution
59. Id.
60. Port, supra note 54, at 247.
61. Port, supra note 54, at 238-39 (citing Negurosu Denko KK v. Matsushita Denko KK,
1819 HANREI JIHO 121 (Tokyo Koto Saibansho, May 31, 2002)).
62. Id. at 239.
63. Long, supra note 7, at 1069-70.
64. Port, supra note 54, at 240-41 (citing Tokyo Kyuko Dentetsu KK v. Takachi Noboru,
1639 HANREI JIHO 115 (Toyo D. Ct., Mar. 13, 1998)).
65. Id. at 240.
66. Id.
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protection under Article 2-1(2).67 Nonetheless, with no explanation,
the court held that the use of a similar name for a condominium was
actionable under Article 2-1(1) on the grounds of confusion. 68 Yet
confusion between the name of a magazine and the name of a
condominium seems very unlikely.
In reflecting on these rulings, Professor Port suggests that
"Japanese judges have an inherent distrust of the notion of dilution,"
and that, despite or perhaps because of the apparently broad mandate
of Article 2-1(2), "Japanese judges seem reluctant to apply the
language as written and, instead, seek other options to attempt to
confine the expansion of the trademark right., 69 Professor Port
concludes that "the confused status of Japanese trademark dilution
law indicates a judiciary at odds with the legislature," and that the
courts are attempting "to rein in a right the judiciary sees as
inconsistent with the purposes of trademark protection in Japan., 70 If
Professor Port is correct, then it appears that the Japanese judiciary is
engaging in the same kind of bottom-up attempt to rein in dilution
laws that Professor Long has observed in the United States courts.
The judiciary's discomfort with Article 2-1(2) is somewhat
surprising since, prior to 1993, the Japanese courts were willing to
find confusion even where true confusion was unlikely. 71 The courts
protected trademarks from free riding by employing the concept of
"confusion in the broad sense. 72 Apparently the Japanese courts were
willing, on their own initiative, to extend their traditional legal and
ethical concepts (confusion and fairness) to protect trademarks against
uses which violated the courts' innate sense of business morality. But
the legislative importation of a foreign legal concept designed to
remedy those same perceived abuses has been less successful.
Ironically, the legislative history of Article 2-1(2) indicates that, as of
1992, the Japanese courts had begun to have second thoughts about
their practice of presuming confusion in order to provide a remedy
against free riding. 73 This may offer a partial explanation of the
courts' difficulty in enforcing the new regime. If judicial attitudes
67. Port, supra note 54, at 246 (citing Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. v. Puropasuto,
1890 HANREI JIHO 127 (Tokyo D. Ct., July 2, 2004))..
68. Id.
69. Port, supra note 54, at 231.
70. Id. at 229.
71. See supra note 56-59 and accompanying text.
72. Port, supra note 54, at 252.
73. IPPC REPORT, supra note 56 (noting that courts "have come to question the notion of
presuming confusion").
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toward free riding were already in a state of flux, the courts may be
uncertain about whether, and to what extent, the new law was
intended to alter their past practice.
The bumpy ride experienced by dilution law in the Japanese
courts is ironic for another reason as well. Japan has expressed a
desire to strengthen the dilution laws of other countries, particularly
in Asia, in order to reduce "free riding on the house marks of Japan's
well known companies. 74 Toward this end, Japan's Industrial
Property Council has supported global harmonization efforts, such as
the WIPO Joint Recommendation and a revision of TRIPS which
would require WTO countries to adopt dilution laws.75
2. Right of Publicity
In contrast to dilution, the right of publicity is well-established in
Japan, where the contours of the right are similar to those recognized
in the United States. Celebrities such as actors, therefore, are entitled
to protection against the unauthorized use of their names and
likenesses in advertising.76 Japan recognizes that a celebrity's right of
publicity arises out of an economic interest, and protects that right
under tort law even without a showing of mental suffering. 77 Despite
Japan's civil law tradition, Japanese courts recognize privacy and
publicity rights as constitutional moral rights even though they are
explicitly mentioned neither in the constitution nor in specific
legislation. 78 Liability has sometimes been found even where the
unauthorized use of a person's likeness occurs in a news reporting
context.
79
Japan recognizes that celebrities have both a right of publicity -
an economic right - and a right of privacy - a moral right.80 It is
unsettled whether the economic right is completely separate from the
moral right, which creates uncertainty as to the scope, assignability,
74. INT'L AFFAIRS COMM., INDUS. PROP. COUNCIL, TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL
HARMONIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SYSTEMS IN THE 21 ST CENTURY ch. 2, pt.
II.3(2)(A) (1999), available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou e/index.htm.
75. Id.
76. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at § 6:159 (citing Mark Lester v. Tokyo Daiichi Film, 817
HANREI JIHO 23 (Tokyo D. Ct., June 29, 1976)).
77. Id.
78. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS 283 (Michael Henry
ed., 2001).
79. Id. at 284.
80. See id. at 289 n.9.
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and duration of the right of publicity.8 ' A celebrity's moral right is
infringed if his or her name or likeness is used in a way that harms his
or her fame or reputation.8 2 Absent such harm, only the economic
right is infringed. No specific law addresses these rights; they are
protected under general tort law. Finally, the right of publicity is not
limited to name or likeness. The Tokyo District Court has held that
"the essence of the right to publicity is the power to attract public
attention," and that the right extends to "any matter with economic
value, arising out of that celebrities' [sic] fame or reputation due to
the attraction of public attention.
84
B. Continental Europe
Both dilution and right of publicity laws have strong and long-
standing foundations in continental Europe. Their concurrent
development seems to reflect fundamental European concepts of
morality - personal moral rights, in the case of the right to a person's
name and likeness, 85 and business morality, in the case of dilution
law. 6 The discussion below focuses on Germany, France, and the
Benelux countries because these EU countries have especially well-
established dilution and right of publicity protections. As discussed in
Section IV(C), these countries provide a useful contrast to the United
Kingdom.
1. Dilution
The 1988 Trade Mark Harmonization Directive requires EU
members to bar registration of marks that dilute Community
Trademarks, but merely permits them to bar registration of marks
that dilute marks registered in their national systems.88  These
similarly-worded provisions apply "where the use of the later trade
mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or be
81. Id. at 289 n.10.
82. Id. at 289 n.9.
83. Id. at 289.
84. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at
290-91 n.14 (citing King Crimson case, 1644 HANREI JIHO 141 (Tokyo D. Court, January 21,
1998)) (holding that musicians' right of publicity could be infringed by reproduction of their
record jacket, even if it did not contain their names or likenesses).
85. See infra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
87. First Council Directive 89/104, art. 4(3), 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1.
88. Id. at art. 4(4).
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detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier
trade mark.,
89
The Directive also permits, but does not require, members to
recognize a civil cause of action for dilution:
Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be
entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from
using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or
similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are
not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where
the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of
that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is
detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade
mark.
90
The pre-2004 members of the European Union have all adopted
dilution provisions that conform to the Directive, 91 some with minor
variations in wording. Little controversy or public debate seems to
have accompanied their adoption, most likely because, as discussed
below, dilution concepts were already established to varying degrees
in the domestic laws of much of continental Europe.
Even before the Directive, dilution law was already established
in Germany (where it is said to have originated in the 1925 Odol
mouthwash case)92, the Benelux countries93 (whose domestic law
served as the model for the Harmonization Directive),94 and, to a
lesser degree, France. 95 The German courts recognized dilution-type
claims under the general law of unfair competition. 96 In the Benelux
89. Id. at arts. 4(3), 4(4).
90. Id. at art. 5(2).
91. McCarthy, supra note 29, at 1163.
92. See Soyoung Yook, Trademark Dilution in European Union, II INT'L LEGAL PERSP.
223, 223 (2001).
93. See id. at 242-43; John A. Tessensohn, May You Live in Interesting Times - European
Trademark Law in the Wake of Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 217, 231-32
(1999).
94. Yook, supra note 92, at 227.
95. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
96. Yook, supra note 92, at 259-60; see also Mathias Strasser, The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection Revisited: Putting the Dilution Doctrine into Context, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 375, 405-06 (2000). On this basis, German courts found that
the fame of the Rolls Royce mark was unfairly exploited when a Rolls-Royce automobile was
featured in a poster advertising Jim Beam Whiskey, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [1983] GRUR
247, 15 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT. L. 240 (1984). In addition, they barred
registration of the Dimple mark for cosmetics, because that mark was already well known for
whiskey, Dimple [1985] GRUR 550, 1985 WRP 399 (BGH), 17 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT. L. 271-75 (1986). See Elson Kaseke, Trademark Dilution: A Comparative Analysis
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countries, dilution was addressed in Article 13A of the 1971 Benelux
Trademark Act, which provided that:
Without prejudice to the possible application of ordinary civil law
in matters of civil liability, the proprietor of a mark may, by virtue
of his exclusive right, oppose: 1) any use made of the mark or of a
similar sign for the goods or services in respect of which the mark
is registered, or for similar goods or services; and 2) any other use,
in economic intercourse, of the mark or of a similar sign made
without a valid reason under circumstances likely to be prejudicial
to the proprietor of the mark." 97
Although France amended its trademark laws in 1992 in
response to the Directive, 98 even before then a remedy was often
available for dilution-type claims if they constituted "parasitic
behavior" giving rise to a "disloyal competition" claim under the
liberally-construed tort provisions of the French Civil Code.99
275-76 (March 2006) (unpublished Doctor of Laws dissertation, University of South Africa),
available at
http://etd.unisa.ac.za/ETD-db/theses/available/etd- 10112006-12141 1/unrestricted/thesis.pdf.
Germany amended its trademark statutes to conform to the EU Directive in the Trade Mark
Reform Law of October 25, 1994, §§ 9(l)(3), 10(1) (refusal or cancellation of marks based on
dilution), § 14(2)(3) (providing a cause of action for dilution, even for owners of unregistered
marks). Id. at 299-300.
97. See Yook, supra note 92, at 227 (emphasis added).
98. Article L713-5, the wording of which is slightly different from the Directive,
provides:
Any person who uses a mark enjoying repute for goods or services that are not
similar to those designated in the registration shall be liable under civil law if
such use is likely to cause a prejudice to the owner of the mark or if such use
constitutes unjustified exploitation of the mark.
The foregoing paragraph shall apply to the use of a mark that is well known
within the meaning of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property referred to above.
Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, art. L713-5, Journal Officiel de la Rpublique Fran~aise [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], July 3, 1992 (emphasis added). Article L713-5 has been held to
protect against unauthorized use of a mark even in the absence of confusion, where the
defendant was perceived as borrowing the prestige of the senior user's mark. See Yook, supra
note 92, at 257-58 (citing Cour d'Appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Dec. 15 1993,
1994 E.C.C. 385).
99. For example, in 1962 a French court held that the use of the PONTIAC trademark for
refrigerators caused injury to the owner of the PONTIAC mark for automobiles by blurring the
distinctive character and attractive power of the senior mark. Ruddy R.Y. Clauss, The French
Law of Disloyal Competition, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 550, 553-54 (1995); Yook, supra
note 92, at 258-59.
2008]DILUTION AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: COUSINS? 659
2. Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is strong and historically well-established
in Germany, France, and the Benelux countries. Protection is
particularly strong in the case of likenesses.
The right of publicity is especially well-developed in Germany,
where it is recognized as both a personality right and a commercial
right; the commercial aspect of the right is descendible. 00 The right is
broadly defined,' 0' encompassing soundalikes'
0 2 and look-alikes. 10 3
France has long provided strong protection against unauthorized
commercial use of a name' °4 or likeness.105 Although the right is
100. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 1, 1999, 143
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 214, translation available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work-new/german/case.phpid=726
See also INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 165;
BEVERLY-SMITH, supra note 2, at 104-05.
101. The right to one's name is protected by Section 12 of Civil Code, and the right to
one's image is protected by Section 22 of the Kunsturhebergesetz. See INTERNATIONAL
PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 165, 183; see generally
Susanne Bergmann, Publicity Rights in the United States and Germany. A Comparative
Analysis, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 479 (1999). Both rights are founded in Art. 2(l) of the German
Constitution. See Personality Rights Database, Germany,
http://personalityrightsdatabase.com/index.php?title=Germany (last visited Jan. 10, 2008). See
also Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 14, 1958, 26 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 349, translation available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnationaU/work-new/german/case.php?id=739
(use of plaintiff's image on advertising poster for aphrodisiac violated § 22 of the Act on
Artistic Creations (1907) and Articles I and 2 of the German Constitution).
102. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at
171 (citing Oberlandesgericht [Regional Court of Appeal] Hamburg Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 1990, 1995).
103. Id. at 165 (citing Oberlandesgericht [Regional Court of Appeal] Karlsruhe
Versicherungsrecht 1996, 600).
104. E.g., INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78,
at 148-49 (citing Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
Chalon-sur-Sa6ne, July 29, 1988, Bulletin Information Cour de Cassation 1989 V2, No. 135.).
105. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at
154-55. The right to one's image is protected by Arts. 9 and 1382 of the Civil Code. See Cass.
le civ., July 5, 2005, Bull. civ. I, No. 295, 246 (unauthorized use of person's image was
actionable where he incidentally appeared in same photo with two other persons who were the
subject of a news story), translation available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnationaU/work-new/french/case.php?id=l 235
See also Institute for Transnational Law, University of Texas School of Law, Marlene Dietrich
v. Socidtd France-Dimanche Translation,
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnationat/work-new/frenchlcase.php?id=1254
#developments (subsequent commentary quoting a 1994 judgment of the Versailles Court of
Appeal: "Any person, however famous, has an exclusive right to his picture and to the use which
is made of it, by virtue of which he can oppose its reproduction and dissemination without his
express and special authorisation, subject to the requirements of freedom of information.");
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generally considered a personality right,10 6 French courts and
commentators are currently divided on the circumstances under which
the right to one's image also has the characteristics of a property
right, an issue which affects questions of damages, transferability, and
descendibility.1
0 7
The Benelux countries also provide strong protection against
commercial use of names and likenesses. These rights are founded in
their respective constitutions as well as the general privacy right in
Article 8 of the ECHR.
10 8
C. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom differs from many other EU countries in
that neither dilution nor the right of publicity is a part of its legal
tradition. Dilution legislation was enacted only in response to the
Harmonization Directive.10 9 A right of publicity has yet to be
recognized. Indeed, the courts have only recently begun to recognize
a right of privacy, and only under compulsion from the ECHR." 0
1. Dilution
The conventional wisdom is that dilution laws originated in the
British and German courts."' Although Germany was indeed an early
adopter of the dilution concept, a closer look at the 1898 British case
that is often cited for the dilution concept suggests that Britain was
not in fact an earlier adopter. The case held that the use of the
Personality Rights Database, Johnnie Halliday Case Summary,
http://personalityrightsdatabase.com/index.php?title =JohnnyHalliday_SocHachetteFilipachi
(last visited Feb. 22, 2008); Personality Rights Database, Michael Leeb Case Summary,
http://personalityrightsdatabase.com/index.php?title=MichaelLeeb (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
106. See Eric H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony: Comparative Perspectives on the
Right to One's Image, 76 TUL. L. REV. 673, 680-86 (2002).
107. Id. at 683-86; Elisabeth Logeais & Jean-Baptiste Schroeder, The French Right of
Image: An Ambiguous Concept Protecting the Human Persona, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 511,
535-40 (1998); UCL Faculty of Laws, Institute of Global Law, French Legal News (May 2005),
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/globallaw/legal-news/french/index.shtml; Alain J. Lapter, How the
Other Half Lives (Revisited): Twenty Years Since Midler v. Ford A Global Perspective on the
Right of Publicity, 15 TEX. INTELL.PROP. L.J. 239, 284-88 (2007).
108. See INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78,
at 60-63 (Belgium), 295-304 (Luxembourg), 318-26 (Netherlands).
109. See infra notes 115-119 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 134-156 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Julie Arther Garcia, Trademark Dilution: Eliminating Confusion, 85
TRADEMARK REP. 489, 491 (1995); Walter J. Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution
and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 CAL. L. REV. 439, 448 (1956); Frank I. Schechter, The Rational
Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927).
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KODAK mark on bicycles was infringing and reveals that, while the
goods in that case (bicycles and photographic supplies) were
noncompeting, they were related.'1 2 Both were often sold in the same
stores and Kodak marketed a camera specifically for use on
bicycles. "3 The court's holding was based on a liberal view of
consumer confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation 1 4 rather than on a
novel theory of infringement. As discussed below, even after the
United Kingdom formally adopted a dilution statute in 1994, many
courts seemed reluctant to abandon the requirement of confusion." 5
Like the other pre-2004 members of the European Union, the
United Kingdom has adopted a dilution law that tracks the language
recommended by the 1988 Trade Mark Harmonization Directive."
16
Initially, some British courts refused to interpret these provisions in a
way that dispensed with the traditional confusion requirement." 7
Later decisions acknowledged that confusion was no longer
required, 1 8 but expressed varying degrees of uncertainty as to the
other requirements of section 10(3).119
112. Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. John Griffith's Cycle Corp., (1898) 15 R.P.C.
105, 110.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See infra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
116. Section 10(3) of the Trade Marks Act of 1994 provides:
(3) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a
sign which-
(a) is identical with or similar to the trade mark, and
(b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those
for which the trade mark is registered,
where the trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the
sign, being without due cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the
distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.
Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 10(3).
117. See Baywatch Prod. Co. v. Home Video Channel, [1997] F.S.R. 22, 30 (Ch.) (holding
that § 10(3) requires a likelihood of confusion in cases involving similar marks on dissimilar
goods, because it would be "illogical" to apply a more demanding standard to similar goods than
to dissimilar goods); cf BT plc v. One in a Million [1999] F.S.R. I (C.A.) (leaving the question
open).
118. Sihra's Trade Mark Application, [2003] R.P.C. 44 (holding that confusion as to origin
is not required to oppose registration under § 10(3)); cf Audi-Med Trade Mark, [1998] R.P.C.
863, 871-72 (TMR) (holding that likelihood of confusion is not required under § 5(3) to reject
application for registration)); Oasis Stores Ltd.'s Trade Mark Application, [1998] R.P.C. 631
(TMR) (similar).
119. See Mars UK Ltd. v. Burgess, [2004] EWHC (Ch) 1912, 2004 WL 1476759 (noting
that § 10(3) is "a powerful protection for the trademark owner since it allows an infringement
claim without proof of confusion," but rejecting plaintiff's § 10(3) claim because plaintiff failed
to establish that its color mark, used in product packaging, had a reputation in the United
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After a string of ECJ precedents that interpreted the
corresponding provision of the Trade Mark Harmonization
Directive, 20  British courts began to apply section 10(3) more
liberally, but continued to express uncertainty as to its scope. In Miss
World Ltd. v. Channel 4 Television Corp.,121 the High Court enjoined
a television station from using the term "Mr. Miss World" in
promoting the broadcast of a transsexual beauty pageant, even in the
absence of a likelihood of confusion. The High Court held that the
"Mr. Miss World" mark would violate section 10(3) by taking "unfair
advantage" of the reputation of the "Miss World" mark. 122 In L 'Oreal
SA v. Bellevue NV, 123 the High Court went even further, finding
infringement under section 10(3) where the maker of a series of
"smell-alike" perfumes gave vendors comparison lists identifying the
brand name fragrance that each of its products was imitating.' 24 This
usage was not confusing, and would have been considered truthful
comparative advertising, and thus non-infringing, under United States
trademark laws. 125 The Court of Appeal of England and Wales
expressed concern about the ramifications of the High Court's
holding. 26 Agreeing that the defendant's use was nonconfusing but
was designed to capitalize on the repute of the brand name fragrances,
Kingdom); Daimler Chrysler AG v. Alavi (t/a Merc), [2001] R.P.C. 42 (Ch) (rejecting claim
under § 10(3) because plaintiff failed to show a "connection" between the two marks); Premier
Brands UK Ltd. v. Typhoon Europe Ltd., [2000] F.S.R. 767 (Ch) (stating that likelihood of
confusion was not required under § 10(3), but denying relief because plaintiff failed to
demonstrate any detriment); Daimlerchrysler AG v. Alavi, [2001] R.P.C. 42 (Ch.) (expressing
uncertainty as to the concept of "detriment" under § 10(3)); see also Stephanie Chong,
Protection of Famous Trademarks Against Use for Unrelated Goods and Services: A
Comparative Analysis of the Law in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada and
Recommendations for Canadian Law Reform, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 642, 671-72 (2005); DAVID
S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 441-43
(2002 & Supp. 2006).
120. E.g., Case R 308/2003-1, Mango Sport Sys. S.R.L. Socio Unico Mangone Antonio
Vincenzo v. Diknah S.L., [2005] E.T.M.R. 5; Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG v.
Fitnessworld Trading Ltd, 2003 E.C.R. 1-12537; Case C-251/95, SABEL BV v. Puma AG, 1997
E.C.R. 1-6191.
121. Miss World Ltd. v. Channel 4 Television Corp., [2007] EWHC (Pat) 982, [2007]
F.S.R. 30.
122. The same outcome could have been reached based on likelihood of confusion, since
both parties provided similar services - entertainment in the form of beauty pageants.
123. L'Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 2355, [2007] E.T.M.R. 1, [2007]
R.P.C. 328.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., R.G. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
advertising for knock-off perfume may lawfully identify the brand name of the fragrance being
imitated).
126. L'Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 968, 2007 WL 2817991.
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Justice Jacob expressed difficulty "deciding where to draw the line
between permissible and impermissible 'free riding."",127 Justice Jacob
noted that "you can only have effective comparative advertising
where the advertiser is in some sense 'free riding' on the goodwill of
the target mark."'' 28 He was also uncertain as to the scope of "due
cause" with respect to the comparison lists, because "realistically, you
cannot sell a replica fragrance - a lawful product - without such a
list. ,' 2 9 Finally, with regard to the term "unfair advantage" in section
10(3) of the Trademark Law, as well as Article 5(2) of the
Harmonization Directive, he expressed concern that some courts in
the European Union were treating as unfair every advantage gained
through the use of another's trademark, without allowing for the
possibility that a particular use might in some cases confer a fair
advantage. 30 To obtain clarification on the application of section
10(3) to truthful comparative advertising, the court referred all of its
questions to the ECJ.
131
127. Id. at 27.
128. Id. at 38.
129. ld. at 83.
130. Id. at 91-94. In particular, Justice Jacob expressed concern about the following
statement in Mango Sport Sys. S.R.L. Socio Unico Mangone Antonio Vincenzo v. Diknah S.L.,
which upheld the rejection of an application to register a Community Trademark:
As to unfair advantage, which is in issue here since that was the condition for the
rejection of the mark applied for, that is taken when another undertaking exploits
the distinctive character or repute of the earlier mark to the benefit of its own
marketing efforts. In that situation that undertaking effectively uses the renowned
mark as a vehicle for generating consumer interest in its own products. The
advantage for the third party arises in the substantial saving on investment in
promotion and publicity for its own goods, since it is able to "free ride" on that
already undertaken by the earlier reputed mark. It is unfair since the reward for
the costs of promoting, maintaining and enhancing a particular trade mark should
belong to the owner of the earlier trade mark in question ....
Id. at 88 (citing Case R 308/2003-1, Mango Sport Sys. S.R.L. Socio Unico Mangone Antonio
Vincenzo v. Diknah S.L., [2005] E.T.M.R. 5, [19]).
131. The court referred the following five questions:
1. Where a trader, in an advertisement for his own goods or services uses a
registered trade mark owned by a competitor for the purpose of comparing the
characteristics (and in particular the smell) of goods marketed by him with the
characteristics (and in particular the smell) of the goods marketed by the
competitor under that mark in such a way that it does not cause confusion or
otherwise jeopardise the essential function of the trade mark as an indication of
origin, does his use fall within either (a) or (b) of Art. 5 of Directive 89/104 ?
2. Where a trader in the course of trade uses (particularly in a comparison list) a
well-known registered trade mark for the purpose of indicating a characteristic
(particularly a smell of a fragrance product) of his own product (particularly its
smell) in such a way that:
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The cautionary note sounded by Justice Jacob's opinion in
L 'Oreal could signal a desire to "put the brakes on" the trend toward
a) it does not cause any likelihood of confusion of any sort; and
b) it does not affect the sale of the products under the well-known
registered mark; and
c) it does not jeopardize the essential function of the registered trade mark
as a guarantee of origin and does not harm the reputation of that mark
whether by tamishment of its image, or dilution or in any other way; and
d) it plays a significant role in the promotion of the defendant's product
does that use fall within Art. 5(l)(a) of Directive 89/104 ?
3. In the context of Art. 3a(g) of the Misleading Advertising Directive (84/240)
as amended by the Comparative Advertising Directive (97/55), what is the
meaning of "take unfair advantage of" and in particular where a trader in a
comparison list compares his product with a product under a well-known trade
mark, does he thereby take unfair advantage of the reputation of the well-known
mark?
4. In the context of Art. 3a(h) of the said Directive what is the meaning of
"presenting goods or services as imitations or replicas" and in particular does this
expression cover the case where, without in any way causing confusion or
deception, a party merely truthfully says that his product has a major
characteristic (smell) like that of a well-known product which is protected by a
trade mark?
5. Where a trader uses a sign which is similar to a registered trade mark which
has a reputation, and that sign is not confusingly similar to the trade mark, in
such a way that:
(a) the essential function of the registered trade mark of providing a
guarantee of origin is not impaired or put at risk;
(b) there is no tarnishing or blurring of the registered trade mark or its
reputation or any risk of either of these;
(c) the trade mark owner's sales are not impaired; and
(d) the trade mark owner is not deprived of any of the reward for
promotion, maintenance or enhancement of his trade mark.
(e) But the trader gets a commercial advantage from the use of his sign by
reason of its similarity to the registered mark
does that use amount to the taking of "an unfair advantage" of the reputation of
the registered mark within the meaning of Art. 5(2) of the Trade Mark Directive ?
L'Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 968, T 164, 2007 WL 2817991.
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expansive interpretations of section 10(3). Although not mentioned by
Justice Jacob, another recent decision of the High Court may add fuel
to such concerns. In Julias Samann Ltd. v. Tetrosyl Ltd.,132 the High
Court used section 10(3) to effectively give one party a monopoly
over the market for air fresheners shaped like Christmas trees:
There is a real probability that members of the public seeing the
Christmas Tree product will think that it is another product in the
Magic Tree range or a Christmas version of the Tree products. In
my judgment the evidence and comparison of the marks and sign
establish that the average consumer will make a link between the
sign and the Tree marks and that this will inevitably damage the
distinctiveness of the Tree marks. Their capacity to denote the
products of the claimants exclusively will be diminished. 
133
The pendulum which initially rejected the dilution concept in
Baywatch may have swung too far in the opposite direction in Julias
Samann. Judicial treatment of dilution claims in the United Kingdom
has yet to settle into a consistent pattern.
2. Right of Publicity
The status of the right to protect one's name and likeness under
United Kingdom law is strikingly different from that of most of
continental Europe. As discussed earlier, 134 the right to privacy is
well-established in Continental Europe, and the right of publicity is
receiving increasing recognition as an outgrowth of that right. In the
United Kingdom, a right to privacy is only just beginning to be
recognized, and it has not yet led to protection for a person's name or
likeness either as an aspect of privacy or as property.
Absent either a privacy-based or property-based right to prevent
unauthorized commercial use of a person's name or image, such
activities are actionable in the United Kingdom only where a plaintiff
can establish passing off, false advertising, or libel.' 35 For example,
musical performers the Spice Girls and Abba both failed in their
attempts to enjoin unauthorized merchandising activities, because
they were unable to prove that consumers would believe that the
performers had endorsed the merchandise. 136 In the courts' view, it
132. Julias Samann, Ltd., v. Tetosyl, Ltd., [2006] EWHC (Ch) 529, [2006] E.T.M.R. 75.
133. Id. at 83.
134. See supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
135. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 6:155.
136. Lyngstad v. Anabas Prods., Ltd., [1977] F.S.R. 62 (Ch.); Halliwell v. Panini, LEXIS
June 6, 1997 (Ch.) (unreported transcript available through LEXIS service-enter "NAME
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was not sufficient that the defendant was exploiting the performers'
appeal and reputation.
The sudden emergence of a right of privacy in the United
Kingdom is the result of an unusual combination of top-down and
bottom-up phenomena; the courts have been given a mandate to find
and define a right of privacy with neither legislative guidance nor a
common law tradition on which to base that right. 37 Until recently,
the UK had long resisted any recognition of privacy rights, largely
due to concerns that such rights would have a chilling effect on
freedom of the press, and would be the subject of unpredictable
judicial interpretation. 138 Although the UK ratified the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR) in 1951, the nation's lack of enthusiasm for the
concept of privacy protection delayed any implementation of the
Convention until 1998, when the Human Rights Act was passed.
39
The privacy protections within the Human Rights Act were
nonspecific, stating only that the courts and other public authorities
must comply with the Convention as interpreted by decisions of the
European Human Rights Commission and the Court of Human
Rights. 40 The British government explicitly stated that it would not
enact specific privacy legislation, and that it was up to the courts to
develop a privacy doctrine in compliance with these authorities. 141 As
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales has observed, "[t]he courts
have not accepted this role with whole-hearted enthusiasm.
142
When the European Court of Human Rights held in Von
Hannover v Germany143 that Article 8 of the ECHR requires members
to affirmatively provide a privacy remedy against private actors,'
44
English courts at last concluded that the United Kingdom was
required to recognize a right of privacy. 45 However, because they
lacked a common law concept of privacy, the courts attempted to
(halliwell) and NAME (panini)" in search of England and Wales Reported and Unreported
Cases); see also Lapter, supra note 107, at 278-82.
137. See infra notes 139-154 and accompanying text.
138. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at §§ 6:154-6:155.
139. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at
437.
140. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 12; see INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND
PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 438.
141. Douglas v. Hello Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, 46, [2005] E.M.L.R. 28.
142. Id.
143. Von Hannover v. Germany, 40 E.H.R.R. 1 (2005), [2004] E.M.L.R. 21.
144. Douglas v. Hello Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, 46-49.
145. Id. at 46.
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implement the right as an extension of existing doctrine. The 2003
decision in Douglas v. Hello Ltd. held a newspaper liable for
publishing unauthorized photographs of the wedding of Michael
Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones. 146 The court based its holding on
the tort of breach of confidence. 147 Because no confidential
relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the defendant
newspaper, the court simply dispensed with the traditional
requirement that the confidential information be "disclosed in
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence," stating that this
condition would not be required in a situation "where a person can
reasonably expect his privacy to be respected.'
148
Soon, however, the courts openly acknowledged that the breach
of confidence tort was ill-suited for protecting a general right of
privacy: "We cannot pretend that we find it satisfactory to be required
to shoe-horn within the cause of action of breach of confidence claims
for publication of unauthorized photographs of a private occasion."'
149
Although courts in a common law nation are certainly comfortable
with the general concept of developing legal doctrines to fill
legislative gaps, it is striking that the British courts so openly stated
their discomfort with being compelled to stretch existing doctrine to
cover a new right that was alien to their legal tradition.
This awkward formulation ended a year later, when the House of
Lords held in Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd.'50 that
Article 8 of the ECHR required them to recognize that a person's
right to privacy is violated when a disclosure concerns matters as to
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Although the
judges recognized that the privacy right must be weighed against the
Convention's Article 10 rights of free speech and press,' 51 the
majority concluded that Campbell's privacy right outweighed the
public's interest in seeing a photograph of her leaving a meeting of
Narcotics Anonymous.1
52
Although the House of Lords openly acknowledged a right of
privacy in the Campbell case, it expressly declined to recognize a
146. Douglas v. Hello Ltd., [2003] EWHC (Ch) 786, [20031 E.M.L.R. 31.
147. Douglas v. Hello Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, 51-53.
148. Id. at172.
149. Id. at 53.
150. Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers, Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] E.M.L.R. 15.
151. See id. at 86.
152. Seeid. at 125.
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generalized right to protect one's likeness from unauthorized use.'
53
Because this particular photograph pertained to an aspect of Naomi
Campbell's private life, the court instead held that the newspaper had
violated her right to prevent public disclosure of private
information. 1
54
Despite the recent and rapid recognition of the right to privacy in
the United Kingdom, the British courts still do not recognize a right to
prevent unauthorized use of one's name or likeness, a well-
established right elsewhere in Europe. While Michael Douglas,
Catherine Zeta-Jones, and Naomi Campbell can prevent the
noncommercial use of their photographs when those photographs
involve disclosures of private information, they cannot prevent
commercial uses of their names or likenesses unless those uses
defame them or falsely imply their endorsement of goods or
services.1" In the limited context of commercial advertising,
however, celebrities may ask the advertising standards authorities to
seek injunctive relief on their behalf. 156
D. Canada
Canada's dilution statute has seen little use, and the few cases
applying it have done little to clarify its scope. In contrast, a right of
publicity has been recognized in at least six provinces, 157 by statute
and by common law, even without a federal or constitutional
mandate.
1. Dilution
In Canada, a dilution statute has been on the books since 1953,158
but has seen little use. The statute, which is now section 22 of the
1985 Trade Marks Act, prohibits unauthorized uses of registered
marks that are "likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of
the goodwill attaching thereto." Although the history of section 22
suggests that it was intended to replicate the concept of dilution as it
153. "Unlike France and Quebec, in this country we do not recognise a right to one's own
image." Id. at 154 (citing Aubry v. Editions Vice-Versa Inc., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591 (Can.)).
154. Jd. at 125.
155. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at
447-48.
156. Id. at 448.
157. See infra notes 171-189 and accompanying text.
158. WELKOWITZ, supra note 119, at 444.
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had evolved in the United States at that time, 159 54 years after the
enactment of this provision, courts still have not determined what it
means to depreciate the value of goodwill. This is not surprising,
because section 22 offers little guidance to assist the courts. That this
omission was deliberate is evidenced by comments from the Chair of
the Trade Mark Law Revision Committee that recommended the
legislation:
The intention of the Act of 1953 is to accord to the court very
broad powers of discretion in deciding questions of infringement.
Any conduct likely to have the effect of depreciating the goodwill
attaching to a trademark is a matter left entirely to the discretion of
the court and the Act of 1953 quite properly prescribes no rules for
the exercise of the discretion. The answer will depend upon the
facts of each case and the breadth of view brought to bear on
modem commercial questions by any judge called to interpret the
section. 
16 0
The Canadian courts thus found themselves invested with
virtually unbounded authority to establish rules for a new cause of
action that had no foundation in the common law. The result, not
surprisingly, has been a curious mixture of confusion, literalism, and
paralysis.
The first case applying section 22, the 1968 Clairol case,161
interpreted it as preventing truthful comparative advertising. The
court strangely limited the statute's application by holding that it
applied to comparative information on the product's packaging but
not to comparative information in promotional brochures. 162 A 1985
case applying Clairol held that section 22 was violated where a
defendant referenced the plaintiffs product in a non-disparaging way
simply by showing that the competing products were compatible and
similar;163  oddly, the defendants did not even contest thisinterpretation. 164
159. Mirko Bibic & Vicky Eatrides, Would Victoria's Secret Be Protected North of the
Border?A Revealing Look at Trade-Mark Infringement and Depreciation of Goodwill in
Canada, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 904, 904 (2003).
160. Id. at 912 (quoting H.G. Fox, THE CANADIAN LAW OF TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION 340-42 (1972)).
161. Clairol Int'l Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equip. Co., [1968] 2 Ex. C.R. 552.
162. See the discussion in WELKOWITZ, supra note 119, at 444. See also David
Welkowitz, Protection Against Trademark Dilution in theU.K and Canada: Inexorable Trend
or Will Tradition Triumph?, 24 HAST. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 63, 100-02 (2000).
163. Interlogo, AG v. Irwin Toy Ltd., [1985] 3 C.P.R.3d 476, para. 20 (Fed Ct.).
164. Id.
670 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 24
Canadian courts have been highly inconsistent in applying
section 22 to parodies in advertising, 165 holding in 1983 that the
PERRIER mark was depreciated by a "Pierre Eh!" label parodying
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, 166 but rejecting a claim that SEXUAL
PURSUIT depreciated TRIVIAL PURSUIT (despite finding a
likelihood of confusion in the latter case). 167
Nor have the courts clarified whether section 22 applies to
blurring or free-riding. The Canadian Supreme Court's 2006 decision
in the Veuve Clicquot case tells us only that "a mental association of
the two marks does not, under section 22, necessarily give rise to a
likelihood of depreciation."'
' 68
Viewed together, these cases suggest that Canadian courts
interpret "depreciation" as an especially broad form of tarnishment,
by applying section 22 to uses that may reflect negatively on the
mark. For example, comparative advertising is truthful and beneficial
to consumers, but can "depreciate" the mark by suggesting that
another maker's product may be equal or superior. The Canadian
courts have not applied section 22 to uses which merely blur the
distinctiveness of a mark or free-ride on its ability to attract
consumers. Indeed, the correctness of this narrow view was asserted
by Justice Thurlow in Clairol:
As I see it goodwill has value only to the extent of the advantage of
the reputation and connection which its owner enjoys and whatever
reduces that advantage reduces the value of it. Depreciation of that
value in my opinion occurs whether it arises through reduction of
the esteem in which the mark itself is held or through the direct
persuasion and enticing of customers who could otherwise be
expected to buy or continue to buy goods bearing the trade mark. It
does not, however, as I see it, arise, as submitted by Mr.
Henderson, from danger of loss of exclusive rights as a result of
use by others as this in my view represents possible loss of
exclusive rights in the trade mark itself rather than reduction of the
goodwill attaching to it. 
169
Given the paucity of case law applying section 22, its meaning is
unlikely to be clarified in the near future. As Professor Welkowitz has
noted, section 22 cases often fail to move forward, because the
165. See WELKOWITZ, supra note 119, at 444.
166. Source Perrier (Socidt6 Anonyme) v. Fira-Less Marketing Co., [1983] 2 F.C. 18, 70
C.P.R.2d 61.
167. Horn Abbott Ltd. v. Thurston Hayes Devs. Ltd., [1997] 77 C.P.R.3d 10, 22 (Fed. Ct.).
168. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Lt~e, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 824, 850.
169. Clairol Int'l Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equip. Co., [1968] 2 Ex. C.R. 552, 573.
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plaintiffs frequently fail to meet the Canadian courts' demanding
standard for preliminary injunctions. 70 This standard has the effect of
weeding out many section 22 claims, thus enabling the Canadian
courts to minimize the impact of section 22 without engaging in the
type of substantive judicial activism that might otherwise be needed
to restrict the scope of the statute.
2. Right of Publicity
Even though there is no federal or constitutional mandate to
protect privacy in Canada,' 71 the right of publicity is protected in at
least six of its provinces.' 72 The civil law province of Quebec adopts
the French view that a person's name and likeness are protected as an
inalienable personality right,' 73 while the common law provinces treat
name and likeness as property.' 74 The general trend seems to be
toward broader acceptance of a right of publicity similar to that
recognized in the U.S.
175
Four of the common law provinces have privacy statutes that
specifically prohibit the unauthorized use of a person's name or
likeness in connection with promoting goods or services, 176 while a
fifth, Ontario, protects the right at common law.' 77 Quebec protects
the right under several sections of its Civil Code. 178 The Supreme
Court of Canada has been strongly protective of privacy rights, even
where they conflict with freedom of expression, although the latter is
expressly mentioned in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, while the right of privacy is not.'
79
In Ontario, the right of publicity has branched off from the
doctrine of passing off, and is now protected under the common law
170. WELKOWITZ, supra note 119, at 445 n.69 (collecting cases).
171. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 74.
172. See infra notes 173-189 and accompanying text.
173. See Les Editions Vice-Versa v. Aubry, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591, 592.
174. See. e.g., Athans v. Canadian Adventures Camps, [1977] 17 O.R.2d 425, 1977 Ont.
Rep. LEXIS 86 (Ont. High Ct.) (professional athlete's image was protected against unauthorized
commercial use even absent passing off). See also MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 6:157.
175. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 6:157.
176. Privacy Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 336 (1979); Privacy Act, R.S.M., ch.74, § 3(c) (1970);
Privacy Act, NFLD. R.S., ch. 6, § 4(c) (1981); S.S., ch. P-24, § 3(c) (1978); see MCCARTHY,
supra note 6, § 6:157.
177. See infra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
178. Quebec Civil Code, R.S.Q., ch. C-1991, tit. 2, ch. Ill, arts. 35, 36(5) (2006); see
MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 6:157.
179. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at
74-75.
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tort of misappropriation.'" The right is treated as a property right and
is descendible.181 Although it has predominantly been applied to
celebrities, it applies to noncelebrities as well.
182
In Quebec, as in France, there is strong protection for the
unauthorized use of a person's photograph. 183 Unlike France,
however, Quebec explicitly extends protection beyond photographs to
include name, image, likeness, and voice. 184 As in France, the right is
an inalienable right of personality. 185 However, enforcement of the
right may be withheld in cases involving matters of legitimate public
interest.186 Although statutes explicitly recognizing the right were
enacted in 1994,187 Quebec courts had recognized the right as early as
1973.188 The Quebec courts, as well as the Supreme Court of Canada,
found that the right to prevent unauthorized use of a one's likeness
was implicit in the general privacy provisions of the 1975 Quebec
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. 8 9
E. Australia
Given their cultural, historical, and political similarities, it is
remarkable that Australia and the United States occupy opposite ends
of the legal spectrum with regard to the rights of privacy and publicity
and the dilution doctrine. Unlike many of its trading partners,
180. See, e.g., Athans v. Canadian Adventures Camps, [1977] 17 O.R.2d 425, 1977 Ont.
Rep. LEXIS 86 (Ont. High Ct.); Krouse v. Chrysler Canada, Ltd. [1973] 1 O.R.2d 225. See also
INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 89
(collecting cases, and citing Howell, The Common Law Appropriation of Personality Tort,
[Can.] INTELL. PROP. J. 149, 170-72 (1986)); MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 6:157.
181. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 89
(citing Horton v. Tim Donut Ltd, [1997] 75 C.P.R.3d 451, 459-60; Gould Estate v. Stoddard
Pub'g. Co., [1996] 30 O.R.3d 520 (Gen. Div.)). In contrast, the right is not descendible under
the British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland statutes, and the Manitoba statute is
silent on descendability. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra
note 78, at 80; MCCARTHY, supra note.6, § 6:158.
182. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 91.
183. Id. at 84.
184. Qudbec Civil Code, R.S.Q., ch. C-1991, tit. 2, ch. 111, art. 36(5) (2006);
INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 85.
185. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 86.
186. See, e.g., Field v. United Amusement Corp., [1971] C.S. 283 (involving a
documentary film depicting participants in the Woodstock music festival).
187. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 85.
188. See Rebeiro v. Shawinigan Chemicals (1969) Ltd., [1973] C.S. 389.
189. Aubry v. Les Editions Vice Versa Inc., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591; Belasky v. 3164055
Canada Inc., [1986] R.R.A. 851 (Super. Ct.); Cohen v. Queenswear Int'l Ltd., [1989] R.R.A.
570 (Super. Ct.); Bogajewicz v. Sony of Can. Ltd., [1995] 128 D.L.R.4th 530 (Que. Super.Ct.);
see INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 84-87.
2008]DILUTION AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: COUSINS? 673
Australia recognizes neither a right of publicity (or privacy) nor a
right to prevent trademark dilution; unauthorized use of a likeness or
a trademark is actionable only if passing off is established. Yet
Australian law makes perfect sense in light of its roots in English
common law. Today, the United Kingdom is reluctantly embracing
both privacy and dilution laws only because of pressures to conform
to the policies and practices of continental Europe. However, because
it is less influenced by Europe, Australia today is more English than
the English. It remains to be seen whether the United Kingdom's
reluctant embrace of dilution and privacy laws will eventually have an
impact on Australia.
Australia is currently under no compulsion from international
trade agreements to change its position on privacy, publicity, or
dilution doctrine. Unless that situation changes, any move toward the
adoption of dilution or privacy laws will be the result of self-
determination. This would require, in the case of privacy and
publicity rights, a change in social attitudes and, in the case of
dilution laws, a convincing argument by trademark owners that the
economic benefits of dilution protection outweigh the interference
with free speech and competitive freedom. With respect to privacy,
publicity and dilution laws, Australia is the laboratory of the future.
1. Dilution
Australian trademark law contains no explicit dilution provisions
and Australia is not a party to any international agreement requiring
dilution protection. Indeed, unlike many of the United States' other
recent bilateral trade agreements,1 90 the 2004 U.S.-Australia Free
Trade Agreement contains no dilution provisions.1 91
Australia's close neighbor New Zealand enacted a dilution law
for well-known marks in its Trademarks Act of 2002, closely tracking
the language of the EU Trade Mark Harmonization Directive. 192
190. E.g., U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.2(7), (9), June, 6, 2003,
117 Stat. 909; U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Jordan, art. 4(l)(a), Oct. 24, 2000; U.S.-
Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Korea, art. 18.2(8), June 30, 2007, 8 U.S.T.
2217; U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Oman, art. 15.2(7), 11 U.S.T. 1835 (pending
implementation). These agreements are available at the website of the United States Trade
Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Sectionlndex.html.
191. The U.S.-Australia FTA is available at the website of the United States Trade
Representative, supra note 190.
192. The Trade Marks Act, 2002, Act No. 49, § 89(l)(d), provides:
(1) A person infringes a registered trade mark if the person does not have the
right to use the registered trade mark and uses in the course of trade a sign --
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However, unlike the dilution statutes of New Zealand and the EU
countries, Australia's trademark statute omits the crucial language
referring to unfair advantage or detriment. Until 1995, Australia
provided an infringement cause of action only where a mark was used
on similar or related goods. 193  Section 120(3) of Australia's
Trademarks Act of 1995 now satisfies Article 16(3) of TRIPS with
respect to registered well-known marks, but it still requires the
trademark owner to show that the defendant's use of the mark on
unrelated goods suggests "a connection" between the defendant's
goods and the owner of the registered mark:
A person infringes a registered trade mark if:
(a) the trade mark is well known in Australia; and
(b) the person uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially
identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in
relation to:
(i)goods (unrelated goods) that are not of the same
description as that of the goods in respect of which the
trade mark is registered (registered goods) or are not
closely related to services in respect of which the trade
mark is registered (registered services); or
(ii) services (unrelated services) that are not of the same
description as that of the registered services or are not
closely related to registered goods; and
(c) because the trade mark is well known, the sign would be
likely to be taken as indicating a connection between the
unrelated goods or services and the registered owner of the
trade mark; and
(d) for that reason, the interests of the registered owner are
likely to be adversely affected. 1
94
(d) identical with or similar to the registered trade mark in relation to any
goods or services that are not similar to the goods or services in respect of
which the trade mark is registered where the trade mark is well known in
New Zealand and the use of the sign takes unfair advantage of, or is
detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the mark
193. See Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v. Nike Int'l Ltd., (2000) 202 C.L.R. 45 36-49
(discussing Trade Marks Act of 1955).
194. Trade Marks Act, 1995, Act No. 119, § 120(3) (emphasis in original).
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There is little case law applying section 120(3).195 This has not
stopped some commentators from suggesting that the provision is
already broad enough to protect well-known marks against dilution.'
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Although a 2000 decision by the Australian High Court suggested,
obliquely and in dictum, that section 120(3) might protect a mark
from "'dilution' of its distinctive qualities or of its value to the
owner,"' 197 no case has interpreted section 120(3) so broadly. 198 The
adoption of the statutory phrase "indicating a connection," in contrast
to taking "unfair advantage of' or causing "detriment to" the value of
mark, suggests that, at least for now, a plaintiff seeking relief under
section 120(3) must show a likelihood of confusion or deception as to
origin, endorsement, or association.
Like many other countries, Australia defines infringement of a
registered mark to include the use of that mark on goods or services
which are the same as, similar to, or closely related to, the goods or
services for which the mark is registered. 199 In the case of identical
goods or services, a likelihood of confusion is presumed.2 °° Where the
goods or services are merely similar or closely related, however, there
195. A Westlaw search indicates that only nine cases have been reported.
196. Frederick Mostert & Trevor Stevens, The Protection of Well-Known Trade Marks on
Non-Competing Goods, 7 AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. J. 76, 84 (1996); INTELL. PROP. RESEARCH
INST. OF AUSTL., UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE, REVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT OF TRADEMARKS:
SUBMISSION TO THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN RESPONSE TO ITS
ISSUES PAPER ON REVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT OF TRADE MARKS 28-29 (2002) [hereinafter
IPRIA].
197. Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v. Nike Int'l Ltd. (2000) 202 C.L.R. 45, 42. In
discussing the importance of confusion or deception under other provisions of Australian
trademark law, the Court observed in passing that:
In this decade, legislation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and now in
Australia to varying degrees has extended the infringement action to restrain
activities which are likely adversely to affect the interests of the owner of a
"famous" or "well-known" trade mark by the "dilution" of its distinctive qualities
or of its value to the owner.
Id. A footnote indicates that the Australian provision referenced here is § 120(3). The IPRIA's
subsequent claim, in its 2002 submission to the ACIP, that "the High Court must have intended
in Campomar v. Nike that sub-section 120(3) does not require likely confusion," was based
entirely on this excerpt. IPRIA, supra note 196, at 29.
198. In applying § 120(3) to a defendant's unauthorized use on coffee products of a well-
known mark which the plaintiff had registered for pasta products, the Federal Court of Australia
tacitly assumed that confusion as to association was required, pointing out that "it is well-known
that food and beverage manufacturers make a variety of different products and that brands are
extended over different products." San Remo Macaroni Co. v. San Remo Gourmet Coffee Pty
Ltd. (2001) 50 I.P.R. 321, 331.
199. Trade Marks Act, 1995, Act No. 119, §§ 120(1), (2).
200. Id. § 120(l).
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must be a likelihood of deception or confusion. 20 1 Moreover,
trademark infringement under several other provisions of Australian
law requires that the marks be "substantially identical" or
"deceptively similar," the same terms that are used in section 120(3).
Case law interpreting this language in the other provisions of
Australia's trademark law has construed these terms narrowly;
20 2
interpretations under section 120(3) are likely to conform to this
practice. Thus, even if the phrase "indicating a connection" in section
120(3) is construed broadly enough to apply to blurring, tamishment,
or free riding, this application might in practice be limited to marks
that are virtually identical, which would limit the potential reach of
any dilution protection arising under the current statute.
Will the forays of New Zealand and the United Kingdom into
dilution law persuade Australia to follow suit? Despite Australia's
close connections with these countries and with the United States,
there seems little likelihood that Australia will amend its trademark
laws to add a dilution provision in the near future. Although
Australia's Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP) has
recommended further study of the issue,20 3 it reports receiving widely
varying submissions on the need for such legislation,20 4 and the
International Trademark Association (INTA) reports that there has
been little advocacy for dilution laws within Australia. 205 The dearth
of cases litigated thus far under section 120(3) suggests that it would
be premature at present for Australia to consider any further
expansion of the protection for well-known marks.
201. Id. § 120(2). Australia's common law also employs a liberal concept of passing off,
applicable to false suggestions not only as to origin but as to "association, quality, or
endorsement." Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v. Nike Int'l Ltd. (2000) 202 C.L.R. 45, 88-89.
202. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Sole N Pty Ltd. (1981) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 491, 495
(SOLAROID not substantially identical to POLAROID); SAP Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Sapient Austl.
Pty Ltd. (1999) 48 I.P.R. 593, 604 (SAPIENT not substantially identical to SAPIENT
COLLEGE); Coca-Cola v. All-Fect Distribs. Ltd. (1999) 96 F.C.R. 107, 121 (candy in shape of
Coca-Cola bottle was not substantially identical).
203. The ACIP submitted a series of recommendations in its Review of Trade Mark
Enforcement in April, 2004. Recommendation 7 advises:
(a) The Government should support research into the economic and legal benefits
of, and costs associated with, extended protection of well-known marks.
(b) Australia should continue to actively participate in international discussions
regarding well-known marks.
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTELL. PROP., REVIEW OF TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT 5 (2004),
available at http://www.acip.gov.au/library/reviewtmenforce.pdf.
204. Id. at 21.
205. PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN MARKS, supra note 33, at 6.
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In its 2002 submission to the ACIP, the Intellectual Property
Research Institute of Australia (IPRIA) cautioned against adoption of
dilution provisions without conducting a broad review of:
(a) "Whether the theory that protection against dilution
leads to benefits for consumers and innovation is borne
out in practice," and
(b) "Whether the costs of protection against dilution are
worth the benefits. 2 °6
Such searching reviews have been noticeably absent in most of
the countries that have adopted dilution laws. This failure to
legitimize almost certainly contributes to the confusion experienced
by their judiciaries in attempting to interpret and apply those laws. If
Australia adopts a dilution law, as a result of international pressures
rather than domestic policy analysis, the absence of a legitimizing
domestic foundation may lead Australia's courts to experience the
same dissonance they have observed in their foreign counterparts.
2. Publicity
Like the United Kingdom prior to the 1998 Human Rights Act,
Australia does not recognize a right of privacy or publicity in a
person's name or likeness.20 7 Celebrities whose identities are used for
commercial purposes generally have no remedy unless they can
establish passing off or defamation.20 8
If a right of publicity does emerge in Australia, it is likely to
result from increasingly broad interpretations of passing off, because
there is no privacy doctrine to serve as a foundation. Courts have
already held that passing off may arise where the use of a celebrity's
likeness falsely suggests an endorsement of the defendant's product
or service. 20 9 In dictum, one court has suggested that an unauthorized
206. IPRIA, supra note 196, at 33; see also J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a Trademark
Has Been Diluted: Theories or Facts?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 713, 717-18 n.15 (2004) (discussing
Australian law).
207. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at
34-35.
208. Rosina Zapparoni, Propertising Identity: Understanding the United States Right of
Publicity and its Implications - Some Lessons for Australia, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 690, 693-94
(2004); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 6.156; INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND
PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 35, 37.
209. See, e.g., Henderson v. Radio Corp. Pty, 60 N.S.W.St. R. 576, 603-04 (1960) (finding
false endorsement where dancers' images were used on a dance record); INTERNATIONAL
PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS , supra note 78, at 35 (collecting cases); Daniel
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use of a celebrity's likeness should be actionable regardless of
whether consumers are actually misled into believing that the
celebrity endorses the goods;2'0 however, no court has squarely
adopted this approach. 211 In 1979, the Australian Law Reform
Commission proposed creating a new cause of action for the
unauthorized use of a person's name or likeness in advertising, 2  but
this proposal has not been adopted.213
V. CONCLUSION
Although both dilution and the right of publicity are part of a
strong tradition in parts of continental Europe, in most other parts of
the world at least one of these concepts is relatively novel and, when
introduced, has presented difficulties for the judiciary. Because
publicity laws are usually based on the widely recognized concept of
privacy, they are generally more widespread than dilution laws.
Nonetheless, even this underlying right of privacy is not universally
recognized. In countries like the United Kingdom and Australia,
which do not have a tradition of privacy law, the introduction of a
right of publicity is likely to engender confusion similar to that which
has engulfed dilution laws.
Thus, while in the United States dilution and the right of
publicity have come to strongly resemble one another as two types of
protection for intangible property, because they are rooted in two very
different traditions these doctrines bear little resemblance to one
another overseas. The right of publicity flows almost inexorably from
the right of privacy; where publicity rights are not yet established, this
is typically because privacy laws are either nonexistent (as in
Australia) or not well-developed (as in the United Kingdom).
However, in trademark law the leap from protecting consumers
R. Shanahan, "Image-Filching'" in Australia: The Legal Provenance and Aftermath of the
"Crocodile Dundee" Decisions, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 351(1991).
210. See Hogan v. Koala Dundee Pty (1988) 20 F.C.R. 314, 322.
211. INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS, supra note 78, at 36.
212. Under the proposal, a defendant would be liable:
If he, with intent to exploit for his own benefit, the name, identity, reputation or
likeness of that other person and without the consent of that other person,
publishes matter containing the name, identity or likeness of that other person -
(a) in advertising or promoting the sale, leasing or use of property or the supply
of services; or (b) for the purpose of supporting candidature for office.
AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, REP. No. 11, UNFAIR PUBLICATION: DEFAMATION AND
PRIVACY 1 250 (1979) (as reported by Hong Kong Law Reform Commission, December 2004,
at http://www.hklii.org/hk/other/hklrc/reports/2004/12_1/1 I.html).
213. MCCARTHY, supra note 6 § 6:156.
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against deception to protecting trademark owners against diminution
of their assets seems to require a greater degree of legitimization in
order to succeed. Confusion-based trademark doctrine is deeply
rooted in tort law's visceral concept of deceit, but dilution's roots are
in more abstract notions of business morality as to which there is less
universal agreement.
Accordingly, the success of transplanting these two doctrines
from one culture to another seems to depend in large part on whether
the host culture accepts the underlying premises - that human dignity
requires respect for name and likeness, and that commercial fairness
precludes disparagement, "whittling away," or free-riding on the
hard-earned prestige of another's brand. In countries where these
premises have not taken root - such as the United Kingdom and
Australia - both doctrines face a hard trek to acceptance. When the
rights are mandated by some extraterritorial source2 14 or even when
these doctrines are voluntarily imposed by domestic law but without
thorough consideration and debate (as in Canada's dilution statute),
they lack the legitimizing foundation which would help the judiciary
to understand the laws and apply them consistently.2 5
Australia, which currently is unburdened by obligations to adopt
either dilution or right of publicity laws, and which lacks a cultural
foundation for either, presents us with a tabula rasa. If Australia
adopts these laws as the result of international harmonization
pressures, one may expect to see the judiciary react with skepticism
and inconsistency. In contrast, if Australia engages in a searching
review of the costs and benefits of these laws, and concludes from
this study that adopting a dilution law or recognizing a right of
publicity will serve the public interest, this may provide the
legitimizing foundation necessary to ensure clarity in the drafting of
the laws and consistency in their judicial interpretation.
214. For example, the United States has used bilateral trade agreements to mandate
dilution laws for Chile, Jordan, South Korea, and Oman, see supra note 190, and multinational
agreements have introduced dilution and privacy laws into the United Kingdom. See supra notes
109-156 and accompanying text.
215. Not to be overlooked is the question whether the advocates themselves-those who
frame the issues for the courts-have an adequate understanding of the meaning and purpose of
the laws so that their advocacy can stimulate more rigorous analysis by the judiciary. Advocates,
too, need a legitimizing foundation to give credibility to their arguments.
* * *
